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212 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS-FEDERAL
PATENT LAW DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE TRADE SECRET LAW
Plaintiff company brought suit in federal district court' to enjoin
defendants from disclosing or using trade secrets.2 Plaintiff, a
manufacturer of synthetic crystals,3 had taken over sixteen years
to develop the unique technology necessary to produce a synthetic
crystal 17 inches in -size. Plaintiff considered some of these processes
to be trade secrets. Defendant corporation, established and later
joined by former employees of plaintiff, took only nine months to
develop the same technology. All of the individual defendants, while
employees of the plaintiff company, had executed at least one agree-
ment not to disclose confidential information or trade secrets ob-
tained in their employment. The district court, applying Ohio trade
secret law,4 granted a permanent injunction as to some of the
alleged secrets.5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that although the district court's findings
of fact were not clearly erroneous, Ohio's trade secret law was
preempted by federal patent law." The Supreme Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit in holding that state trade secret law is not pre-
empted by the United States Patent Laws.8 Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974).
Trade secret law is a common law phenomenon originating in
this country around the middle of the 19th century.9 The statutory
1. This was a diversity action brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
2. The most widely accepted definition of a trade secret is found in the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS.
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
3. The crystals are useful in the detection of ionizing radiation. Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1974).
4. OHIo R. C. § 1333.51(C) (Supp. 1973) provides:
No person, having obtained possession of an article representing a trade secret
or access thereto with the owner's consent, shall convert such article to his
own use or that of another person, or thereafter without the owner's consent
make or cause to be made a copy of such article, or exhibit such article to
another.
Generally, though, states have based their trade secret protection on common law and
equitable doctrines rather than on statutory provisions. R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 2 (1953).
For a discussion of trade secret protection under criminal law (theft), refer to 12 R.
MIGRIM BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS TRADE SECRETS § 1.10 (1967).
5. The district court ruling is not reported.
6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'1d, 94 S. Ct. 1879
(1974). Because of the fact situation In Kewanee, this holding was narrowed to trade
secrets eligible for patent consideration but which had been in commercial use for' over one
year and were therefore precluded from obtaining a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1970). On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered the broader issue of patent preemption
of all trade secrets.
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
8. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. Justice Marshall filed a concurring
opinion. Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Brennan concurred, filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Powell did not take part.
9. The case often cited for the basis of much trade secret law in this country Is Pea-
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patent law arises out of the Patent and Copyright Clause' o of the
Constitution. Each had coexisted for 100 years. The holder of a
patentable invention could choose either avenue of protection." The
issue of preemption by federal law of state trade secret 'law is
of modern origin, arising primarily from dicta and dissent in three
recent Supreme Court cases.' 2
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' s and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc.,' 4 it was held that items in the public
domain cannot be the subject of injunctions against copying based
on state unfair competition laws, because applying such laws would
be in conflict with the purposes of federal patent law.1 5 However,
in reaching their conclusions, the Sears and Compco Courts employed
overly broad langauge such as:
[B]ecause of the federal patent laws, a state may not, when
the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copy-
ing of the article itself or award damages for such copying.6
This language suggested that unpatented information was precluded
from protection under state trade secret law. Although these deci-
sions had dealt with matters in the public domain and had nothing
to do with trade secrets (by definition, not in the public domain),
many writers subsequently discussed the preemption question.1 7 In
body v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). For a discussion of the development df trade secret
case law in this country refer to Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT.
OF?. Soc'y, 638, 644-46 (1970).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 provides in part:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....
11. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) ; 12 R. MIL-
GRIM BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS TRADE SECRETs § 2.08 [1] at 2-53, § 8.02 [1] at 8-3 (1967) ;
Marmorek, The Inventor's Common Law Rights Today, 50 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'y, 369, 881
(1968).
12. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) ; Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
13. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
14. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Because of their virtually identical fact situations and holdings,
Sears and Compco are usually cited together.
15. 376 U.S. at 231-32. 376 U.S. at 237. In the Sears case the Stiffel Co. had marketed a
highly successful pole lamp on which it had secured a design patent. Sears copied It and
sold the substantially identical lamp at a lower price. Stiffel's suit in federal district court
for patent infringement and violation of Illinois unfair competition law resulted in the in-
validation of the patent for lack of inventiveness. But an injunction was granted under the
state law which was designed to protect consumers from confusion as to the source of goods.
After the Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that to do other-
wise would interfere with the patent policy favoring free competition in the use of ideas in
the public domain. 376 U.S. at 230-31.
16. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 232, 233 (dictum). Both Sears and
Compco did note that state law may require those who make copies to clearly label them so
as to not pass them off as the original. Id. at 232; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. at 238.
17. E.g., Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption-the Aftermath of Sears and
Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 713 (1967) ; Doerfer, The jimits on Trade Secret Law Im-
posed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 H&Rv. L. REv. 1432 (1967) ; Treece,
Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1964);
Note, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 956 (1968)
Note, Trade Secrets After Sears and Compeo, 53 VA. L. Rgv. 356 (1967).
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1969 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the issue
in Lear Inc. v. Adkins' s but declined to do so.19 However, in a
partial dissent written by Justice Black and joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas, the issue of preemption was held to
have already been decided, against the states, in Sears and
Compco. 20 Although Lear fueled the continuing debate over preemp-
tion, the majority of courts continued to uphold trade secret law.21
Four courts of appeals22 had decided against preemption when the
Sixth Circuit in this case placed the issue squarely in view.
As a starting point, the Supreme Court reviewed the salient
features of patents and trade secrets, implicitly acknowledging that
much of the difficulty has come from misunderstanding. The Court
noted that a patent functions to give its holder a complete right
of exclusion against everyone for a limited time,23 while the holder
of a trade secret is protected only against those who seek to use
or disclose the secret in breach of contract or confidential relation-
ship or who have obtained it by improper means. 24 Thus, as to
those who by independent research, accidental disclosure, or by
ccreverse engineering, ' 25 obtain the information, there is no protec-
tion afforded the trade secret holder.
Next, the Court held that the Patent Clause 26 did not preclude
state enactment of trade secret laws.27 Turning to the main issue
18. 895 U.S. 653 (1969).
19. Id. at 675. The decision in Lear is significant In that it overturned the doctrine of
licensee estoppel under which a licensee had been precluded from challenging the validity
of the licensed patent In a suit for royalties due under a contract.
20. Id. at 676-77.
21. See Milgrim, Sears To Lear To Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 17, 24 n.31 (1971) ; 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 4, at § 7.08[2][c] n.43.
22. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar Indus, Inc. v.
Bisset-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971);
Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of
America v. Gen. Elec. Co., 937 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 342 F.2d 993
(1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 914 (1966).
23. " very patent shall contain . . . a grant . . . for the term of seventeen years . . .
of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States .. " 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
24. The case often cited as illustrative of "improper means" Is E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
While duPont was constructing a plant, Christopher flew overhead In a small plane taking
pictures In an attempt to discern duPont's methods and processes of manufacture.
25. "Reverse engineering" is the method of studying the finished product, which is In the
public domain, and attempting to discover the trade secret from It.
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, supra note 10.
27. 94 S. Ct. at 1885. In doing so, the Court referred to its decision in Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) wherein it was held that the Constitutional (art. 1, § 8) grant
of copyright power was not exclusive as to writings. In Goldstein, Chief Justice Burger re-
ferred to the principles first stated by Alexander Hamilton in Number 32 of Tix FEDERALIST.
Hamilton saw the removal of state power in only three situations: (1) if a power is ex-
clusively delegated to the central government; (2) if a power is delegated to the central
government and expressly denied to the states; and, (3) if a power Is delegated to the
central government, to which a similar power In the states would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant. Id. at 250 (J. Hamilton ed. 1885) (A. Hamilton; emphasis in
the original). In applying the third principle the decision cited to Cooley v. Board of War-
dens, which stated:
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit of only
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may Justly be said to be of such a
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of preemption by virtue of the Supremacy Clause 28 of the U.S.
Constitution, the Court noted that the determinative consideration
was whether the state law acts as an obstacle to the purposes
and objectives of Congress in passing the federal law.29 The Court
identified the objectives of patent law as the encouragement of
invention, the requirement of disclosure,3 0 and the policy that items
cannot be removed from the public domain by action of the states.
The objectives of trade secret law were said to be the encouragement
of invention and the maintenance of commercial ethics. The Court
proceeded to determine whether the state law in question interfered
with federal patent legislation.
First, as to matters not meeting the statutory requirement for
patent consideration, 1 the Court found no conflict between federal
and state laws because Congress had passed no laws affecting
them.32 In considering those items eligible for patent consideration,
the Court recognized the possibility of conflict and the issue remained
whether trade secret protection could function as an alternative
to patent procedures.
No conflict with the patent objective of encouraging invention
was found by the Court since trade secret law also seeks to encourage
it. 3 The patent policy regarding matters in the public domain was
not affected by trade secret law, the Court held, because trade
secrets are by definition not in the public domain.34
In order to examine the effect of trade secret law on the patent
objective of disclosure, the Court divided trade secrets eligible for
patent consideration into three categories: (1) those known to its
holder to be not patentable; (2) those whose patentability is consi-
dered doubtful, and (3) those believed by the holder to be patent-
able.3 5 As for trade secrets known to be not patentable, there was
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VT, cl. 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.29. 94 S. Ct. at 1885 citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
30. Disclosure is the price the public exacts in return for the limited monopoly Or right
of exclusion conferred by a patent. To insure full disclosure a patent application must "con-
tain a written description . . . in such full, clear, concise and exact terms . . . to enable
any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same .. " 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) limits inventions eligible for a patent to " . . . any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.... ." After meeting this initial requirement, inventions then are
go-t0 §§ Of'- 95 'ssusno!Aqouou puu 'AS11I1n 'kfIAoU Jo sluatui nboa tl. J0J poziutlflns
(1970).
32. 94 S. Ct. at 1887. The Court noted that even If trade secret protection was abolished,
there could be no increased disclosure since a patent was unavailable. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court acknowledged that this was the approach used by Judge Henry
Friendly in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir. 1971). Id.
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no conflict because even if trade secret protection was abolished,
the mere filing of a patent application would not result in disclo-
sure.36 The Court further observed that trade secret protection for
this category serves useful purposes such as encouraging invention
in areas that patent law fails to reach and preventing a detrimental
mis-allocation of resources and economic waste.87 In its analysis
of trade secrets of doubtful patentability, the Court found no conflict
with the patent objective of disclosure since the superior rewards
of patent protection would favor the seeking of a patent.38 The
Court also noted that the availability of trade secret law to this
category has a beneficial effect on society and patent policy-'9
Finally, considering trade secrets of known patentability, where the
public interest in disclosure would be highest, the Court found that
the superior rewards of patent protection would again serve to re-
move any conflict with the state law.40  Regardless of category,
the Court specifically acknowledged the state interest in providing
protection under trade secret law to instances of industrial espio-
nage.41
The Court concluded by stressing the importance of trade secret
law, the absence of any conflict with patent objectives, and the
wisdom of Congress, by its silence over the years, in allowing the
states to enforce it.42
The instant case is an important decision for the still-developing
law of trade secrets because it removes the existing doubt of its
validity. The opinion, which carefully noted the importance and
utility of trade secret law, will serve to strengthen its growth.
36. Id. at 1888. Public disclosure does not occur during the period an application is
pending. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
37. 94 S. Ct. at 1888-89. The Court reasoned that in the absence of trade secret law,
holders of trade secrets would be forced to spend large sums for self help protective meas-
ures and that research might become fragmented for the same reason. In addition, the
incentive for trade secret holders to license their secrets would be decreased because of the
lack of legal protection.
38. Id. at 1889.
99. Id. The Court reasoned that abolition of trade secret protection would falsely en-
courage non-patentable applications to the patent office with two undesirable results. First,
the patent office would turn down some but In the meantime society would have been
denied the use of these discoveries through trade secret protected licensing. Second, the
patent office would grant a patent to others but that patent would be found invalid If
ever challenged in the courts. Id.
40. Id. at 1891. The Court noted that even if a rare inventor would choose trade secret
protection over a patent, or even choose to keep the invention secret, the ripeness of time
concept of invention dictates the prediction that independent discovery of the same inven-
tion would soon take place. Id. at 1890.
41. Id. at 1889. Industrial espionage is "the practice of engaging n surreptitious sur-
veillance for the purpose of discovering a businessman's secrets." Comment, Industrial
Espiontage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 911(1967). The Court stated that besides the increased costs necessar'y to protect against in-
stances of burglary, wiretapping, etc., there is an inevitable cost to the basic decency of
society when firms steal from each other. In addition, the Court stated that the funda-
mental right of privacy was involved which served to make the state interest in providing
protection against industrial espionage, unchallengeable. 94 S. Ct. at 1889.
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1892. If Congress desires to expressly preempt the trade secret area, It
could, of course, do so with appropriate legislation,
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The case can also be viewed as a further recognition of the basic
principles of our federal system, which allow the states to develop
their own approaches to issues not demanding of national uniformity
and which hold that power not expressly delegated to the national
government is reserved to the states.
LINUS JOHNSON
COURTS-JURISDICTION-STATE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION OVER A
DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN ENROLLED RESERVATION INDIANS
Plaintiff and defendant were both enrolled members of Indian
tribes1 and both resided within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations.2 They were married pursuant to Montana law outside
the boundaries of any Indian reservation. Northern Cheyenne Indian
marriages have been performed and divorces granted pursuant to
Montana law since 1937, when the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council
adopted a provision in the tribal code requiring all marriages and
divorces to be so consummated.3 Plaintiff filed for a divorce in
the state district court and defendant was served with process while
she was within the boundaries of a Montana reservation. Defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the grounds the state court lacked
personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted
the motion to dismiss on both counts. Plaintiff appealed. The Montana
Supreme Court reversed and held that since the marriage took
place off the reservation, the tribal ordinance effectively granted,
the district court jurisdiction over the divorce action and validated
the service of process on the defendant inside the reservation. Bad
Horse v. Bad Horse, - Mont.-, 517 P.2d 893 (1974).
The Indian tribes were once separate nations within the United
States. Conquest and the imposition of treaties induced these nations
to surrender their complete independence and the right to go to
war. In return, the tribes were given federal protection, aid, and
grants of land. In 1830, Georgia attempted to impose its laws on
the Cherokee Reservation. In Worcester v. Georgia,' which chal-
1. Plaintifff is an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe. Defendant
Is an enrolled member of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in
North Dakota.
2. Plaintiff resides within the boundaries of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.
Defendant was residing at Poplar, Montana, located within the boundaries of the Fort
Peck Indian Reservation when served with process.
3. N. CHEY. TRIBAL CODE, ch. 3, § 1 ,(1966) provides:
All Indian marriages and divorces must be consummated in accordance with
the laws of the State of Montana, except that no common-law marriages
shall be recognized within the bounds of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.
4.Worcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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